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NOTES
Punitive Damages in Constitutional Tort Actions
Private damage actions for the vindication of violated constitu-
tional rights are available against state and federal officials.' The
measure of damages in such actions, however, is not clear. Although
a plaintiff can recover compensatory damages, it is uncertain
whether a plaintiff can recover punitive damages. Three recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States2 addressed whether
the Court should allow punitive damages in constitutional tort ac-
tions, but none definitively resolved the issue.
This note examines the current and potential state of the law on
punitive damages in constitutional tort actions. Part I discusses the
three recent 'Supreme Court decisions strongly suggesting that plain-
tiffs can recover punitive damages in appropriate constitutional tort
actions; part II determines whether history and policy considerations
support these Supreme Court decisions; and part III determines the
probable requirements for the recovery of punitive damages in con-
stitutional tort actions.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1871,3 Congress created a federal rem-
edy for a person who is deprived of constitutional rights by another
acting under color of state law.4 Recent Supreme Court decisions
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) allows a cause of action against state officials. The Supreme
Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), inferred a similar cause
of action directly under the Constitution against federal officials. See notes 3-12 and accom-
panying text infra.
2 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981); Carlson v. Green, 100
S. Ct. 1468 (1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
3 The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979)). The
statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
4 See generaly Clabo, 42 US.C § 1983, 9-10 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 65 (1977-
1978); McCormick, Federalism andSection 1983: Limitations onJudicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Claims, Part II, 60 VA. L. REv. 250 (1974); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort
Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Special Smposium: Section 1983, 12 URBAN LAW 227 (1980).
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have established that local governments are subject to suit as persons
within section 1983,5 and that the section 1983 damages remedy may
be available for violations of federal as well as constitutional law.
6
A section 1983 remedy is unavailable, however, where federal
officers violate constitutional rights, since they do not act under color
of state law. But the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents 7 established an implied cause of action for money damages
against federal officers for violations of constitutional rights.8 A Biv-
ens remedy is a judicially created version of section 1983, except that
it applies to persons acting under color of federal law as opposed to
state law.9
Bivens inferred a constitutional damage remedy from the fourth
amendment. The Supreme Court subsequently held that such a
remedy could also be inferred from the eighth amendment 1 as well
as the due process clause of the fifth amendment."' Lower federal
courts have extended Bivens to other constitutional guarantees as
The legislative background of § 1983 is exhaustively addressed in Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-95 (1978).
5 Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Carlisle,
Owen v. City of Independence: Toward Constructing a ModelAr Municipal Liabiliy after Mone/l,
12 URBAN LAw 292 (1980); Kramer, Section 1983 and Municipal Liabili: Selected Issues Two
YearsAfter Monell v. Department of Social Services, 12 URBAN LAw 232 (1980); Schnapper,
Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213 (1979).
6 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). See Comment, Section 1983. Carte Blanche Rem-
edy for Federal Statutoy Violations?, 10 STRTsoN L. REv. 506 (1980).
7 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
8 In Bivens, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Bivens' apartment, mana-
cled him in front of his family, and thoroughly searched the premises'without probable cause.
403 U.S. at 389. Bivens sought substantial damages from each of the agents, but since federal
officers rather than state officers committed the alleged constitutional violations, a section
1983 remedy was unavailable. The Supreme Court, however, invoked its traditional remedial
powers to allow money damages directly under the fourth amendment. Id. at 397.
9 Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F. 2d 862, 871 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Kirkpatrick, Defning a
Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983 The State-of Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 46
(1977). The author contended that "[t]he Bivens remedy is essentially a judicially created
equivalent of section 1983. There is no statutory counterpart to section 1983 creating a cause
of action against federal officers or other persons violating constitutional rights under color of
federal law." Id. at 49 n. 24. The willingness of appellate courts to incorporate section 1983
law into Bivens suits also reflects the similarity between section 1983 and Bivens actions. See
note 19 and accompanying text inia.
10 Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980). The Court allowed the administratrix of a
deceased federal prisoner's estate to sue federal prison officials for violating the prisoner's
eighth amendment rights by failing to give him proper medical treatment. See notes 45-59
and accompanying text in~fa.
I 1 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). The Court allowed a former congressional staff
member to sue a United States Congressman who allegedly terminated the staff member's
employment on the basis of her sex, in violation of the fifth amendment.
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well. 12
Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action without expressly
providing for the appropriate measure of recovery. Section 1983
merely states that the defendant "shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law."' 3 The measure of recovery in a Bivens case is
similarly vague. In Bivens, the Court said Bivens was entitled to re-
cover "money damages for any injuries. . . suffered as a result of the
agents' violation . . .
In Monroe v. Pape,-5 the Court implied that all forms of monetary
relief traditionally available at common law were available in section
1983 actions.16 Sixteen years later, in Carey v. Piphus,17 the Court ex-
pressly held that the common law of torts was an appropriate start-
ing point for determining damages in section 1983 actions.' 8 The
Supreme Court's decision in Car also sheds light upon the relief
available in Bivens actions, since the courts usually apply the rules
developed under section 1983 in Bivens cases.19
Carey's incorporation of common law tort remedies into constitu-
tional tort actions merits a brief summary of these common law prin-
12 See, e.g., Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F. 2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1977) (fourteenth amendment
due process clause); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F. 2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975) (thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F. 2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment);
Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfield, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (sixth amendment);
Howard v. Warden, Petersburg Reformatory, 348 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1972) (ninth
amendment), appeal dismissed, 474 F. 2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1973). See generally Lehman, Bivens and
Its Progny: The Scope ofa Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Oftials, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531 (1977).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
14 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
15 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
16 Justice Douglas stated that section 1983 "should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." 365
U.S. at 187. See generally Nahmod, supra note 4.
17 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
18 Id. at 257-58. Earlier in the opinion the Court stated: "[Section 1983] was intended to
'[create] a species of tort liability' in favor of persons who are deprived of 'rights, privileges, or
immunities secured' to them by the Constitution." Id. at 254.
19 Ellis v. Blum, 643 F. 2d 68, 84 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing general trend to incorporate
section 1983 law into Bivens suits); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F. 2d 871 (3d Cir. 1975) (§ 1983
standards for determining injuries applicable in Biens suits). The Supreme Court seems to
have adopted this view as well. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980), where the
Court strongly suggested that identical rules should govern the availability of punitive dam-
ages in § 1983 and Bivens actions; and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), a Bivens action
where the Court adopted the qualified immunity standard it had developed in § 1983 cases.
See also Note, "Damages or Nothing" - The Eftla4y of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L.




ciples. Under the common law, damage awards are available for
medical expenses, lost earnings, impairment of future earning capac-
ity, property damage, and mental and physical suffering.20 These
damages attempt to put the plaintiff in the position he would have
been but for the defendant's breach of a legal duty.21 Punitive dam-
ages are also available upon a showing of a highly culpable state of
mind, malice or ill will usually being necessary.
22
An overwhelming number of lower federal courts allow compen-
satory and punitive damages in section 198323 and Bivens actions.
2 4
However, the Supreme Court's indirect handling of the issue has cre-
ated doubts about the availability of punitive damages in a constitu-
tional tort action. Yet a fair reading of three recent Supreme Court
decisions establishes that punitive damages are an appropriate and
integral component of the relief available in constitutional tort
actions.
I. Recovery of Punitive Damages in Constitutional Tort Actions:
The Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court's reluctance to directly address the availa-
20 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 3.1, 7.3 (1973); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 905-06 (1977).
21 D. DOBBS, supra note 20, § 3.1.
22 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 81 (1935). Only four states
- Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington - do not allow punitive damages in
tort actions. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 2, at 9 n. 61 (4th ed. 1971).
For discussions of punitive damages, see generaly Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8
FORUM 411 (1972); Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 303 (1980) [herein-
after cited as In Defense of Punitive Damages].
23 See, e.g., Green Bay & W.R. Co. v. United States, 644 F. 2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981);
Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F. 2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980); Morrow v. Igleburger, 584 F.
2d 767 (6th Cir. 1978); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F. 2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976); Paton v. LaPrade,
524 F. 2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F. 2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968). But see Huntley v. Community School Bd. of Brooklyn, 579 F. 2d. 738 (2d
Cir. 1978); Soto v. Chardon, 514 F. Supp. 339 (D.P.R. 1981) (both courts reserved judgment
on the issue).
24 See, e.g., Brady v. Smith, 656 F. 2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1981); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.
2d 862, 872 (3d Cir. 1975); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F. 2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975). Several
courts hold that the punitive damages sought in Bivens suits may be considered in determin-
ing jurisdictional amount. See, e.g., Pitrone v. Merchandante, 420 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 n. 6
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Shifrmn v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1287 n. 1 (D.D.C. 1976); Gardels v.
Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Some courts have not permitted punitive
damages in Bivens suits. See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566 F. 2d 167, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F. 2d 594, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Other courts have expressed uncertainty about whether punitive damages are available in
Bivens actions. See, e.g., Love v. Budai, No. 79-1551 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 16, 1981); Ricca v.
United States, 488 F. Supp. 1317, 1327 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Hernandez v. Lattimore, 454 F.
Supp. 763, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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bility of punitive damages in constitutional tort actions reflects the
serious misgivings of both courts and commentators about the place
of punitive damages in our legal system.25 There are primarily three
arguments against allowing punitive damages. First, the retribution
aspect of punitive damages is an anomaly in tort law, since tort law
purports merely to compensate the aggrieved plaintiff. Second, some
critics of punitive damages challenge the constitutionality of "pun-
ishing" a defendant in a civil forum through the imposition of puni-
tive damages. Third, punitive damages result in a windfall to the
plaintiff, are difficult to compute, and can result in repetitive or ex-
cess sanctioning.
26
The Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning punitive dam-
ages in constitutional tort actions must be read against this backdrop.
The Court treaded carefully into this area in Cary v. Piphus,27 made
bold strides in Carlson v. Green,28 and effectively sanctioned the recov-
ery of punitive damages in appropriate constitutional tort actions in
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 29
In Carey, an elementary and a secondary student filed section
1983 actions against school officials, alleging they had been sus-
pended from school without procedural due process. The district
court consolidated the cases for trial and found for the students, as-
serting that the school officials should have known that a lengthy
suspension without an adjudicative hearing would violate procedural
due process.30
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit remanded the case
to the district court to reconsider the measure of damages, since the
district judge had improperly excluded evidence at trial.3 ' The Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that even if the district court found that the
students' actions justified the suspensions, the students were entitled
to recover substantial "nonpunitive" damages because the school of-
25 One commentator stated that many courts preface an award of punitive damages with
the caveat that punitive damages are not a favorite of the law of torts. In Defense of Punitive
Damages, supra note 22 at 304 n. 5. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 11. 2d 172, 188, 364
N.E. 2d 353, 360 (1978); Beck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 355,
126 Cal. Rptr. 602, 607 (1976). Other leading commentators are not supportive of punitive
damages, caveat or not. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 2; D. DOBBS, supra note 20,
§ 3.9, at 19-21.
26 See generally Belli, Punitive Damages: Their Hirto , Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day
Society, 49 UMKC L. REv. 7, 8 (1980); In Defense of Punitive Damages, supra note 22, at 304-05.
27 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
28 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980).
29 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981).
30 435 U.S. at 251.
31 Id. at 252.
[February 1982]
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ficials denied them procedural due process. 32 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to consider whether, in an action under section
1983 for the deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must
prove that he actually was injured by the deprivation before he may
recover substantial 'nonpunitive' damages.
'33
Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, broke new
ground by holding compensation to be the primary purpose of a sec-
tion 198334 damage award. Citing several section 1983 cases, as well
as Bivens, the Court concluded damages were available under section
1983 for actions "found. . .to have been violative of. . .constitu-
tional rights and to have caused compensable injuy."
'35
Carey also established the common law of torts as the "appropri-
ate starting point" for the fashioning of damages in a section 1983
action, although the common law would not always provide the com-
plete solution. 36 The Court reasoned that in some cases courts should
tailor the rules governing compensation for the deprivation of consti-
tutional rights to the particular right in question.37 Addressing the
constitutional deprivation at issue, the denial of procedural due pro-
cess, the Court held that absent a showing of actual injury, the
schools' denial of procedural due process entitled the students only to
nominal damages.
38
The Court offered contradictory language about punitive dam-
ages. First, the Court maintained that "to the extent that Congress
intended that awards under section 1983 should deter the depriva-
tion of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to
establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the
award of compensatory damages."39 While this language seems to
foreclose the recovery of punitive damages, the Court also stated that
punitive damages might be awarded in a "proper case" under section
32 Id.
33 Id. at 253.
34 Many courts apply § 1983 case law to Bires actions. See note 19 and accompanying
text supra. Thus, Cary's reasoning is relevant to Birens actions as well as § 1983 actions.
35 435 U.S. at 255.
36 Id. at 258.
37 Id. at 265.
38 Id. at 264. Many courts have applied Carov's "actual injury" requirement to other
constitutional violations. See, e.g., Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F. 2d 461, 463 (2d
Cir. 1978) (first amendment); Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1230 (D. Minn. 1979)
(fourth amendment). But see Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding
that Cary's proof of actual damages did not apply to fourth amendment violations). Seegener-
ally Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration after Carey v. Piphus, 93
HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Damage Awards].
39 435 U.S. at 256-57.
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1983 with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing violations of
constitutional rights.4° The Court recognized thit six different cir-
cuits allowed punitive damages in section 1983 actions,4' but did not
approve or disapprove of these cases. The Court held that because
the district court specifically found that the school officials did not
act with a malicious intent to deprive the students of their rights, no
basis for a punitive damage award existed in this case.
42
Several lower federal courts have cited Carey for the proposition
that punitive damages are recoverable in section 1983 actions.
43
Other lower federal courts and some commentators read Carey as
leaving the issue open. 44 Thus, Carey's language is far from conclu-
sive on the issue of punitive damages.
In the second case in the progression, Carlson v. Green,45 the ad-
ministratrix of a deceased federal prisoner's estate sued federal prison
officials alleging they violated the prisoner's due process, equal pro-
tection, and eighth amendment rights by failing to give him proper
medical treatment. 46 The complaint sought compensatory and puni-
tive damages. 47 The Supreme Court considered whether a remedy
was available directly under the Constitution (i.e., a Bivens action)
when the plaintiff's allegations could also support a claim under the
Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA).
48
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, maintained that Biv-
ens established that victims of constitutional violations by federal
agents have a right to recover damages against those officials except
40 Id.,at 257 n. I1.
41 Id. (see cases cited therein: Silver v. Cormier, 529 F. 2d 161, 163-164 (10th Cir. 1976);
Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F. 2d 438, 444 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. dismirsed, 429 U.S. 118 (1976);
Spence v. Staras, 507 F. 2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1974); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F. 2d 799, 801
(1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F. 2d 573, 576 (5th
Cir. 1967); Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74, 84-88 (3d Cir. 1965)). See also note 23 supra for
other courts allowing punitive damages in section 1983 actions.
42 435 U.S. at 257 n. 11. Later in the opinion the Court further expounded upon com-
mon law compensatory and punitive damages: "[s]ubstantial damages should be awarded
only to compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or
punish malicious deprivations of rights. Id. at 266.
43 See, e.g., Busche v. Burkee, 649 F. 2d 509, 520 (7th Cir. 1981); Shillingford v. Holmes,
634 F. 2d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1981); Konczak v. Tyrell, 603 F. 2d 13, 18 (7th Cir. 1979).
44 See, e.g., Huntley v. Comm. School Bd. of Brooklyn, 579 F. 2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1978).
Some commentators have interpreted Carey in a similar way. See, e.g., Love, Damages, a Remedy
for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1242, 1274 (1979); Damage Awards,
supra note 38, at 983 n.102.
45 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980).
46 Id. at 1470.
47 Id. at 1471.
48 Id. Federal Torts Claim Act, ch. 753, title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946).
[February 1982]
[Vol. 57:530]
in two situations. The first situation is when the defendants demon-
strate "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirm-
ative action by Congress. ' 49  The second situation is when
"defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly
under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective."
50
After determining no special factors counselling hesitation ex-
isted,5' Justice Brennan compared the Bivens remedy to the FTCA
and concluded that the Bivens remedy was more effective. Justice
Brennan cited four factors leading to this conclusion, only two of
which are important for this note's purpose. First, he noted that the
Bivens remedy served a two-fold purpose, compensation and deterrence.
52
This downplays Care's focus on compensation as the basis of section
1983 remedies.53 Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against
individuals, Justice Brennan posited that it was a more effective de-
terrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States. 54 In a
footnote, the Court stated that section 1983 actions also served the
same compensation and deterrence goals as Bivens actions.55 Ac-
cepting deterrence as a section 1983 goal strengthens the case for pu-
nitive damages since deterrence is a goal of punitive damages.
56
The second factor establishing a Bivens remedy's superiority over
a FTCA remedy concerned punitive damages:
[O]ur decisions, although not expressly addressing and deciding the
question, indicate that punitive damages may be awarded in a Biv-
ens suit. Punitive damages are 'a particular remedial mechanism
normally available in the federal courts,'. . . and are especially ap-
propriate to redress the violation by a government official of a citi-
49 Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 1472 (1980).
50 Id.
51 Id. The Court stated that "[p]etitioners do not enjoy such independent status in our
constitutional scheme as to suggest that judicially created remedies against them might be
inappropriate."
52 Id. at 1473.
53 See notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
54 100 S. Ct. at 1473.
55 Id. at 1473 n. 6. The third factor supporting the conclusion that Congress did not
intend to limit the respondent to a FTCA remedy was that a plaintiff cannot opt for a jury
trial in a FTCA suit as he may in a Bives suit. Finally, the Court noted that an FTCA action
exists only if the state in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a cause of
action to go forward. In the Court's view, federal officials' liability for violations of citizens'
rights should be governed by uniform rules. Id. at 1468.
56 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981). The Court noted that
"[p]unitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but
rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter
him and othersjrom similar extreme conduct." Id. at 2759 (emphasis added).
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zen's constitutional rights. Moreover, punitive damages are
available in a 'proper' section 1983 action. ..57
In the Court's view, punitive damages in Bivens actions deter uncon-
stitutional acts better than the FTCA, which expressly prohibits pu-
nitive damages. 58
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court had never
decided whether punitive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit.
Justice Rehnquist also maintained that despite the Court's assertion
to the contrary, it had also never decided whether punitive damages
were available in section 1983 actions. 59
In the wake of Carlson, lower courts and commentators were still
unclear as to whether the Supreme Court allowed punitive damages
in constitutional tort actions. In Love v. Budai,6° for example, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted the con-
flict in the circuit over the issue and chose not to resolve it. Judge
Tamm's opinion in Payne v. District of Columbia,61 cited in Love, illus-
trates the judicial uncertainty about the issue:
It is not clear to me, however, that punitive damages are avail-
able [in a Bivens action]. . . .There was no mention whatsoever in
Bivens of the possible availability of punitive damages...
" * * Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion, for instance,
fairly characterized the essential question facing the Court concern-
ing damages as "whether compensatory relief is 'necessary' or 'ap-
propriate' to the vindication of the interest asserted". . . Whether
or not "vindication" is limited to compensation must remain for
now an open question.
62
57 100 S. Ct. at 1473.
58 Id. at 1474.
59 Id. at 1486-87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60 No. 79-1551 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 16, 1981).
61 559 F. 2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
62 Id. at 827. Other post-Carson cases reflect the judicial uncertainty about the recovery
of punitive damages in constitutional tort actions. See, .g., Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of
Newport, 626 F. 2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1980), reo'd, 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981). The First Circuit said
that it had twice held that punitive damages are available against section 1983 defendants
when there are aggravating circumstances. Citing Carlson and Carey, the court noted that
"[a]lthough the Supreme Court has never fully addressed the question, it has edged toward a
similar conclusion." Id at 1067. See also, Soto v. Chardin, 514 F. Supp. 339, 342-43 (D.P.R.
1981) (asserting that the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on availability of punitive
damages in § 1983 actions); Ricca v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 1317, 1327 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(reserving judgment on the availability of punitive damages in Bivees actions until the resolu-
tion of the issue becomes necessary). One commentator's remarks further illustrate the confu-
sion Carlson wrought: "The [Carlson] Court does not appear to actually hold that punitive
damages may be recovered in a Biehs suit. The language is curiously tentative, and the
placement of the punitive damages in the opinion (merely as an additional supporting factor)
[February 1982]
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In the third case in the progression, City of Newport v. Fact Con-
certs, Inc. ,63 an organization licensed by Newport, Rhode Island to
present musical concerts and a concert promoter sued the city and its
officials under section 1983 alleging that the license's cancellation
was a violation of constitutional rights under color of state law. The
plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages against the city
of Newport and certain named officials.64
At the district court level, the defendants challenged as error the
court's instructions allowing the jury to award punitive damages
against Newport. On appeal, the First Circuit stated that although
the recovery of punitive damages in section 1983 actions was in a
"state of flux," 65 in two earlier First Circuit cases the court awarded
punitive damages against section 1983 defendants. 66 The court cited
Carg and Carlson for the proposition that the Supreme Court "has
edged toward" validating punitive damages in section 1983 actions.
67
Second, the court viewed this in conjunction with the Supreme
Court's determination that municipalities are persons within the
meaning of section 1983,68 and held that the trial judge's punitive
damages instruction was not plain error.
69
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that a munici-
pality may not be held liable for punitive damages under section
1983.70 The Court's opinion in Newport, written by Justice Black-
mun, analyzed the role of punitive damages in constitutional tort ac-
tions. The Court first looked to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, because
"tort liability created by section 1983 cannot be understood in a his-
torical vacuum."' 71 Although the language of section 1983 does not
speak of any immunities, 72 the Court upheld a long line of cases de-
implies that the Court has not addressed the issue squarely as a holding." Comment, Constitu-
tional Law, Bivoen Again, 10 STETSON L. REV. 333 n. 32 (1981).
63 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981).
64 Id. at 2749.
65 Fact Concerts, Inc., v. City of Newport, 626 F. 2d 1060. 1067 (1st Cir. 1980), re'd 101
S. Ct. 2748 (1981).
66 Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F. 2d 114, 121 (1st Cir. 1977); Caperici v. Hun-
toon, 397 F. 2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
67 Fact Concerts, Inc., v. City of Newport, 626 F. 2d 1060, 1067 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101
S. Ct. 2748 (1981). The Court viewed Carlson's language regarding punitive damages as
dictum.
68 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
69 Fact Concerts, Inc., v. City of Newport, 626 F. 2d 1060, 1067 (1st Cir. 1980), re'd, 101
S. Ct. 2748 (1981).
70 101 S. Ct. at 2762.
71 Id. at 2755.
72 See note 3 supra for a complete text of section 1983.
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clining to construe section 1983 as automatically abolishing the im-
munities traditionally afforded state officials. On the other hand, the
Court held that only after careful consideration of history and policy
would a particular immunity defense be incorporated into section
1983. "Indeed, because the 1871 Act was designed to expose state
and local officials to a new form of liability, it would defeat the
promise of the statute to recognize any pre-existing immunity with-
out determining both the policies it serves and its compatibility with
the purposes of section 1983."
,73
The Court concluded that at the time Congress enacted what is
now section 1983, municipal corporations were immune from puni-
tive damages at common law.74 Having thus determined that Con-
gress did not intend to disturb this common law immunity, the Court
pondered policy considerations to decide whether section 1983's
objectives mandated a result contrary to the common law immunity
of municipalities from punitive damages.
In beginning this examination, the Court stated that the pur-
poses of punitive damages were retribution and deterrence, not com-
pensation. Regarding retribution, the Court concluded that
awarding punitive damages against a municipality would only "pun-
ish" innocent taxpayers and that "neither reason nor justice" dic-
tated such a result.75 Justice Blackmun noted that the Court "never
has suggested that punishment is as prominent a purpose under the
statute as are compensation and deterrence.
' 76
Having determined that punishment was not a proper reason
for allowing punitive damages against a municipality, the Court
turned to the other major objective of punitive damages - deterrence.
Asserting that deterrence of future abuses of power by persons acting
under color of state law is an important purpose of section 1983, the
Court said that "it is in this context that the Court's prior statements
contemplating punitive damages in a 'proper' section 1983 action
should be understood. ' 77 It thus appears that punitive damages are
73 101 S. Ct. at 2755.
74 Id. at 2756.
75 Id. at 2759-60. But the Court went on to say that "ifagovernment oftcz'a acts knowingly
and maliciously to deprive others of their civil rights, he may become the appropriate object
of their vindictive sentiments." 101 S. Ct. at 2760 (emphasis added). This suggests that dam-
ages may be assessed against a government official for purelypunitive purposes. But see notes
76-78 and accompanying text infra suggesting punishment is not an appropriate function of.
punitive damages.




appropriate only when used to deter rather than to punish.7 8
After questioning whether punitive damages against the munici-
pality would deter public officials from wrongdoing, the Court noted
a more effective means of deterrence: "By allowing juries and courts
to assess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances against the
offending ofcial, based on his personal financial resources, the statute
directly advances the public's interest in preventing repeated consti-
tutional deprivations." 79 The Court then expressly affirmed Carson
to the extent that "a damages remedy recoverable against individuals
is more effective as a deterrent than the threat of damages against a
government employer."80
II. History and Policy Considerations Support Punitive Damages
in Constitutional Tort Actions
In Newport, the Supreme Court refused to grant municipalities
immunity from punitive damages until it had inquired into the his-
tory and policies underlying such an immunity.8' Likewise, an ex-
amination of history and policy considerations supports the Supreme
Court's recent decisions denying government officials immunity from
punitive damages in constitutional tort actions.
82
In Newport, Justice Blackmun examined the common law in de-
termining whether history supported the immunity of municipal cor-
porations from punitive damages.83 Unlike the case with municipal
corporations, common law history does not dictate a finding that
government officials are immune from punitive damages in constitu-
tional tort actions. The numerous lower federal court decisions al-
lowing the recovery of punitive damages in section 1983 and Bivens
actions even prior to the recent Supreme Court decisions indicate
that the common law did not exempt from punitive damages govern-
78 One might conclude that punitive damages can never be recovered in a § 1983 action
from reading Care's statement that Congress did not intend to establish a more formidable
deterrent than compensatory damages in § 1983 actions. See note 39 and accompanying text
supra. But the Court's later language in Newport indicates this is not the case.
79 101 S. Ct. at 2761 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 2761.
81 See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
82 These decisions are City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981);
Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
83 101 S. Ct. at 2756-59. In his analysis, Justice Blackmun cited several cases denying
punitive damages against municipal corporations. E.g., Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W.
Va. 323, 350 (1882); Hunt v. City of Boonville, 65 Mo. 620 (1877); Woodham v. Nottingham,
49 N.H. 387 (1870); City of Chicago v. Langlass, 52 Ill. 256 (1869).
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ment agents guilty of violating a citizen's constitutional rights.84
Policy considerations also strongly support punitive damages in
appropriate constitutional tort actions. Deterrence of future consti-
tutional torts is a central purpose of both section 1983 and Bivens
actions.8 5 As the Supreme Court stated in Bivens, "[a]n agent acting
- albeit unconstitutionally - in the name of the U.S. possesses a far
greater capacity for harm than an individual. . . exercising no au-
thority other than his own."'8 6 Therefore, both state and federal offi-
cials contemplating illegal activity face the prospect of a
constitutional tort action.87 Holding a government official personally
liable for punitive damages is an effective deterrent.88 Thus, a cen-
tral purpose of constitutional tort actions is furthered through puni-
tive damages.
Punitive damages in constitutional tort actions effectively deter
constitutional violations, yet the qualified immunity afforded public
officials under Butz v. Economou 89 guards against deterring legitimate
government functions.9° The qualified immunity protects public of-
ficials who act with a reasonable belief that they are not violating
anyone's constitutional rights. If the government official knew he
was violating the Constitution (subjective bad faith) or should have
known he was violating the Constitution (objective bad faith), he
loses the qualified immunity defense.91 Thus, punitive damages will
not deter government agents from performing their legitimate gov-
ernment functions since the courts restrict punitive damages to cases
involving bad faith actions.
Punitive damages in constitutional tort actions are especially ap-
propriate to vindicate constitutional rights in light of the Supreme
Court's holding in Carey. Carey stands for the proposition that a vio-
lation of constitutional rights may not be compensable absent a
showing of actual injury, at least in procedural due process cases. 92
The Carey holding may have been motivated in part by the Supreme
84 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
85 See notes 76-80 and accompanying text sufra.
86 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 392.
87 Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. at 1475.
88 See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
89 438,U.S. 478 (1978).
90 As the Supreme Court stated in Carlson, a case where a federal agent was subject to a
suit claiming punitive damages, "even if requiring [federal agents] to defend [the plaintiff's
suit] might inhibit their official duties, the qualified immunity afforded them under Butz v.
Economou. .. provides adequate protection." 100 S. Ct. at 1472.
91 See generalo Love, supra note 44, at 1253.
92 See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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Court's concern about the federal caseload.93 The number of section
1983 actions filed annually has skyrocketed since 1960.94 A holding
that presumed damages flowed from constitutional violations would
have further added to the federal backlog. Many commentators
have criticized the Carey Court for not adopting such a holding, argu-
ing that the Court "minimized" the value of constitutional
guarantees.
95
But allowing punitive damages in constitutional tort actions
softens the impact of these criticisms. While Carey may deter persons
who are not actually injured from bringing a constitutional tort ac-
tion, those who have suffered constitutional wrongs at the hands of a
government official acting in bad faith will not hesitate to bring suit,
since they can recover punitive damages even in the absence of ac-
tual harm.96 Thus, history and policies underlying constitutional tort
actions justify punitive damages in such actions.
III. Requirements for the Recovery of Punitive Damages In
Constitutional Tort Actions
It appears the Supreme Court favors punitive damages against
offending officials in constitutional tort actions, and the history and
policies underlying these actions support this position. However,
courts will still need to consider two issues relating to the imposition
of punitive damages: first, whether compensatory damages are a pre-
requisite to punitive damages, and second, the requisite state of mind
of the government official.
Some state courts have ruled that compensatory damages are a
prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages.97 But under the
93 See, e.g., McClellan & Northcross, Remedies and Damages for Violationr of Constitutional
Rights, 18 DUQUESNE L. REv. 409 (1980). The authors contend that as a result of the flood of
§ 1983 claims, "it is perhaps, not surprising that recently the Supreme Court has undertaken
a reconsideration of the basic nature and scope of section 1983." Id. at 412. The authors cite
Carg's requirement of actual injury as an illustration of the Court's narrowing of section
1983. Id. at 463.
94 The nationwide total of § 1983 lawsuits filed was 260 in 1960, 3,985 in 1970, and
12,313 in 1977. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 452 (1978).
95 The editors of the New Jersey Law Journal argued that "[t]he Constitution and the
public it protects appear to be the losers in Care. One dollar for a constitutional wrong...
seems a poor price to put on rights that are priceless." Editorial, Picing the Constitution, 102
N.J.LJ. 468 (1978). See generally Damage Awards, supra note 38 (advocates awarding damages
without proof of actual injury).
96 Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. at 1473 n. 9.
97 See, e.g., Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co., 68 Me. 279 (1878) (questioning punishment if
injury is merely technical and theoretical). D. DOBBS, supra note 20, § 3.9, at 32 n.32.
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federal common law - and hence, in constitutional tort actions -
nominal damages will support a punitive damages award.98 This is
particularly important in constitutional tort actions because "after
Cary punitive damages may be the only significant remedy available
in some section 1983 actions where constitutional rights are mali-
ciously violated but the victim cannot prove compensable injury." 99
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the state of
mind necessary for a recovery of punitive damages in a constitutional
tort action. Dicta from recent Supreme Court decisions, however,
indicate that punitive damages are appropriate when a government
official knowingly or maizus{y deprives an individual of his constitu-
tional rights.
In Adickes v. Kress, 00 Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion,
concluded that punitive damages were appropriate in a section 1983
action whenever the defendant "acted with actual knowledge that he
was violating a [constitutional] right" or acted with "reckless disre-
gard" of whether he was violating such a right.' 0 Several lower fed-
eral courts have adopted this actual knowledge or reckless disregard
standard as the state of mind requirement for the recovery of puni-
tive damages in constitutional tort actions. 0 2 Several commentators
approve of this standard instead of a standard requiring a greater
degree of intent.10 3 Several lower federal courts have adopted a mal-
ice standard requiring a higher degree of culpability than the knowl-
edge or reckless disregard standard. 0 4 These latter courts seem to be
in accord with the Supreme Court's view of the state of mind neces-
sary for the recovery of punitive damages in a constitutional tort
action.
98 See, e.g., Brady v. Smith, 656 F. 2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1981); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.
2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976).
99 Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. at 1478 n. 9. See also Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F. 2d 102
(3d Cir. 1978), and McClellan & Northcross, supra note 93 at 466. In Cochetti, the court noted
that "the availability of punitive damages as a deterrent may be more significant than ever
today, in view of the apparent trend of decisions curtailing the powers of federal courts to
impose equitable remedies to terminate [constitutional] violations." 572 F. 2d at 105-06.
100 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
101 Id. at 233.
102 See, e.g., Haywood v. Ball, 634 F. 2d 740, 742 (4th Cir. 1980); Cochetti v. Desmond,
572 F. 2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1978); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F. 2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976);
Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F. 2d 438, 444 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1975).
103 See, e.g., Love, supra note 44, at 1281; McLellan & Northcross, supra note 93, at 467.
104 Konczak v. Tyrell, 603 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980);
Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F. 2d 985 (5th Cir. 1979); Huntley v. Community School Bd., 579 F. 2d
738 (2d Cir. 1978); Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F. 2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F. 2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
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In Car and Carlson, the Supreme Court implied that a "mali-
cious intention" was necessary for the imposition of punitive dam-
ages in a constitutional tort action.10 5 In Newport, the Court's
language strongly supported the necessity of a malicious intent in
awarding punitive damages: "If a government official acts knowinglY
and maliciousy he may become the appropriate object of the commu-
nity's vindictive sentiments."' 0 6 The Court also noted that "several
state statutes requiring municipal corporations to indemnify their
employees for adverse judgments rendered as a result of performance
of governmental duties specifically exclude indemnification for mali-
cious or willful misconduct by the employees."'
0 7
Since government officials enjoy a qualified immunity they can
be held liable for damages in constitutional tort actions only if they
knew or should have known that they were violating the Constitu-
tion. Given the state of mind requirement for punitive damages that
the Supreme Court would apparently adopt in the proper case, a
government official who should have known he was violating the
Constitution or who acted in reckless disregard of the Constitution
would not be liable for punitive damages although he would not be
immune from suit.
IV. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has not yet definitively held in what consti-
tutional tort actions punitive damages are proper. Three recent
Supreme Court decisions, however, when read together, indicate that
the Court would sanction punitive damages in constitutional tort ac-
tions against government officials responsible for constitutional
violations.
In Carey, the, Supreme Court held that compensation of the ag-
grieved party was the primary purpose of a section 1983 award. The
Court left open the possibility that punitive damages might be recov-
erable in a proper section 1983 action, although there they held the
plaintiff had to establish an actual injury before the Court would
award more than nominal damages. In Carlson, the Court stated that
Bivens actions serve a two-fold purpose: -compensation and deter-
rence. There the Court stressed the increased deterrence punitive
105 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n. 11 (1978); Carlson v. Green, 101 S. Ct.at 1473 n.
9 (punitive damages only significant remedy where consitutional rights are "maliciously"
violated).
106 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2760 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 2761 n. 30 (emphasis added).
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damages provide. Finally, in Newport, the Supreme Court held a mu-
nicipality may not be held liable for punitive damages under section
1983, although punitive damages were proper where such an award
deterred future constitutional violations.
History and policy considerations support the recovery of puni-
tive damages in constitutional tort actions against offending officials.
The law entitles such officials to a qualified immunity and thus puni-
tive damages would effectively deter conduct resulting in constitu-
tional violations without deterring legitimate government functions.
Consistent with current federal law, plaintiffs would not have to
show compensatory damages to recover punitive damages in consti-
tutional tort actions; a mere showing of nominal damages would be
sufficient. To recover punitive damages, however, recent Supreme
Court decisions indicate that the plaintiff will have to prove the gov-
ernment official knowingly or maliciously deprived him of constitu-
tional rights. The Supreme Court, when presented with the proper
case, should explicitly affirm the availability of punitive damages
against offending government officials in constitutional tort actions.
Matthew P. Feene
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